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Abstract 
 
Policies and explicit incentives designed for self-regarding individuals sometimes are less 
effective or even counterproductive when they diminish altruism, ethical norms and other 
social preferences. Evidence from 51 experimental studies indicates that this crowding out 
effect is pervasive, and that crowding in also occurs. A model in which self-regarding and 
social preferences may be either substitutes or complements is developed and evidence for the 
mechanisms underlying this non-additivity feature of preferences is provided.  The result is a 
preference-based analogue to the Lucas Critique restricting feasible implementation to 
allocations that are supportable given the effect of incentives on preferences. 
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1. Introduction 
Thomas Schelling recalls his “exciting and stimulating times” in the early 1950s White 
House as a young staffer in the Executive Office of the President. “People worked long 
hours,” he remembered in a recent communication to one of us, “and felt compensated by the 
sense of accomplishment, and ... personal importance. Regularly a Friday afternoon meeting 
would go on until 8 or 9, when the chairman would suggest resuming Saturday morning. 
Nobody demurred. We all knew it was important, and we were important. ... What happened 
when the President issued an order that anyone who worked on Saturday was to receive 
overtime pay…? Saturday meetings virtually disappeared.” 
Since Richard Titmuss’ The Gift Relationship: From Blood Donations to Social Policy, 
economists have been intrigued but for the most part unpersuaded by the claim that policies 
based on explicit economic incentives may be counter-productive when they induce people to 
adopt a ‘market mentality’ and thus compromise pre-existing values to act in socially 
beneficial ways (Arrow (1972), Bliss (1972), Solow (1971) ). At the time of its publication 
there were two strong reasons to doubt Titmuss’ claim. First, there was little hard evidence 
that the social preferences such as altruism, fairness, and civic duty that are said to be eclipsed 
by economic incentives are important influences on individual behavior. Second, even if these 
social preferences were thought to be important influences on behavior, there was even less 
evidence (in the Titmuss (1971) book or elsewhere) that explicit economic incentives 
undermine them. As a result it was not implausible to hope that social preferences and self-
interest might contribute additively to the implementation of desirable social outcomes, or 
even in complementary ways. One could agree with Arrow (1971) that “norms of social 
behavior, including ethical and moral codes (may) ...compensate for market failures” and not 
worry that explicit economic incentives designed to overcome market failures might 
compromise social norms and hence be ineffective or even counter-productive.  
Theoretical and empirical advances over the intervening years provide the basis for a 
reconsideration of these issues. First, evidence from both the behavioral experimental 
laboratory and the field has demonstrated that social preferences are important influences on 
economic behavior (Bewley (1999), Camerer and Fehr (2004), Fehr and Falk (2002), Fehr 
and Gachter (2000), Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007), Frey and Jegen (2001), Young and 
Burke (2001)). 
Second, the importance of incomplete contracts has been widely recognized and studied 
empirically (Laffont and Matoussi (1995), Stiglitz (1987), Tirole (1999)). Partly as a result, 
the terms trust, reciprocity, fairness, gift exchange and social capital now appear in the 
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modeling and empirical study of principal-agent relationships, the provision of public goods, 
and other standard economic applications, often referring to the social norms that underwrite 
mutually beneficial exchange, consistent with Arrow’s observation (Akerlof (1984), Benabou 
and Tirole (2006), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008)).  
Third, we may soon be able to isolate the neurological bases of the sometimes 
counterproductive effects of explicit incentives. Recent advances in brain imaging and other 
techniques have provided provisional identification of distinct brain regions whose activation 
is associated with the expression of social preferences (Greene, et al. (2001), Rilling, et al. 
(2002), Sanfey, et al. (2003)) and provided evidence that explicit incentives diminish activity 
in these social reward networks (Li, et al. (2008)).  
Fourth, economists have increasingly turned to the study of cases in which preferences 
are not exogenous but rather are shaped by individuals’ economic and other experiences, 
including their exposure to incentives of differing types (Bar-Gill and Fershtman (2005), 
Becker (1996), Bisin and Verdier (2001), Bowles (1998)).  
Finally, beginning with the Lucas Critique of the exogenous beliefs assumption in 
macroeconomic policy, advances in the theory of public policy have addressed cases in which 
incentives affect both beliefs and preferences and may thus have unintended effects (Aaron 
(1994), Bar-Gill and Fershtman (2005), Bowles (1989, (2004), Cervellati, Esteban and 
Kranich (2008), Frey (1997), Lucas (1976), Sobel (2005), Taylor (1987)). 
Here we extend the logic of the Lucas Critique to questions of framing, motivations, 
and social norms, in short, to preferences. To do this we modify the standard public 
economics and mechanism design assumption that taxes, subsidies, and other explicit 
incentives affect behavior only indirectly, that is by altering the economic costs and benefits 
of the targeted activities. In this conventional approach explicit incentives thus do not appear 
directly in the citizen's utility function and as a result, the behavioral effects of explicit 
economic incentives and social preferences are separable, the effects of each being 
independent of the levels of the other. We modify the citizen’s utility function so that this 
separability property need not hold and as a result the two kinds of motivations may be either 
complements -- social preferences being heightened by incentives appealing to self-interest -- 
or substitutes, when explicit incentives are said to crowd out social preferences. 
Our concern is not with the importance of other-regarding motives, but rather the 
plausibility of the separability assumption. Because it is so often implicit, it may help to 
identify what may be its first explicit statement by John Stuart Mill (1844): 97 
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[Political economy] does not treat of the whole of man's nature...,... it is concerned with 
him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth,… it predicts only such 
...phenomena ...as take place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth. It makes entire 
abstraction of every other human passion or motive. 
 
Incentives may have counter-intuitive and counter productive effects for reasons other 
than non-separability (Seabright (2009)). Strong monetary incentives, for example, may over-
motivate an agent leading to greater than the optimal level of arousal posited by the so called 
Yerkes-Dodson law. This appears to be the mechanism underlying the negative effects of high 
incentives found in three experiments by Ariely, et al. (2005). Similarly, if agents have an 
income target, monetary incentives may allow target attainment with less effort. Camerer, et 
al. (1997) suggest that this may explain why New York City taxi drivers work fewer hours 
when they are making more per hour. Neither of these mechanisms involves the non-
separability of self-regarding and other regarding preferences, which is the focus of this 
paper. 
The experimental evidence for non-separability that we survey here would not be very 
interesting if it did not reflect real-life behavior. Testing for separability in natural settings is 
difficult, but generalizing directly from experiments even for phenomena much simpler than 
separability is often unwarranted (Levitt and List (2007)). Consider, for example, the Dictator 
Game in which a one subject (the dictator) is assigned an endowment of money and asked to 
allocate some portion of it (including none) to a passive recipient. Typically more than 60% 
of subjects allocate a positive sum to the recipient, and the average given is about a fifth of the 
endowment. We would be sadly mistaken if we inferred from this that 60 percent of 
individuals would spontaneously transfer funds to an anonymous passer by, or that the same 
subjects would offer a fifth of the bills in their wallet to a homeless person asking for help. 
Subjects who reported that they had never given to a charity allocated 60 percent of their 
endowment to a named charity in a lab experiment (Benz and Meier (2006)).  
 Most individuals are strongly influenced by the cues of appropriate behavior offered 
by the situation in which an action is taken (Ross and Nisbett (1991)), and there is no reason 
to think that experiments are an exception to this context-dependent aspect of individual 
behavior. Validity concerns arise from four aspects of human behavioral experiments that do 
not arise in most well-designed natural science experiments. First, experimental subjects 
typically know they are under an unknown researcher’s microscope, possibly inducing 
different behaviors than would occur under total anonymity or under the scrutiny of 
neighbors, family or workmates. Second, interactions with other subjects are typically 
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anonymous and without opportunities for ongoing face to face communication, unlike many 
social interactions. Third, subject pools may be quite different from the real-world 
populations of interest, in part due to the process of recruitment and self selection (Calónico, 
et al. (2007), Cardenas and Carpenter (2008)). Finally, many of the experiments that provide 
evidence for the salience of social preferences are deliberately structured as strategic 
interactions like the Ultimatum Game that give scope for ethical or other-regarding behavior 
that may be absent in competitive markets and other important real world settings (Sobel 
(2007)). 
 It is impossible to know whether these four aspects of behavioral experiments bias 
experimental results in ways relevant to the question of separability. For example, the fact that 
in most cases subjects are paid a “show up fee” to participate in an experiment might attract 
the more materially oriented who may be less motivated by other-regarding preferences 
subject to crowding out. But the fact that many of the subject pools are students who have not 
faced the hard choices of making a living might work in the opposite direction. While 
warranting caution in generalizing the details of experimental behavior to the real world, none 
of these validity concerns is sufficient to dismiss the experimental evidence that social 
preferences are important behavioral motivations and that the salience of these preferences 
may be affected by explicit incentives. This is especially the case when experiments identify 
motives that allow a consistent explanation of otherwise anomalous real world examples of 
crowding in or out, such as those mentioned in our concluding section.  
In the next section we provide a taxonomy of cases where separability of social and 
self-regarding preferences does not hold. Because people often react to the mere presence of 
explicit incentives rather than just their extent (Gneezy (2003)), we distinguish between 
categorical and marginal effects. In the subsequent four sections we consider reasons why 
crowding out may occur and provide experimental evidence about four mechanisms that we 
think are involved. These are, first, the fact that incentives provide information affecting the 
behavior of the target in ways additional to the effects on the material costs and benefits of the 
target’s actions; second, the cues to appropriate behavior provided by incentives, third, the 
ways that incentives may compromise self determination and crowd out intrinsic motives, and 
fourth, the effects of incentives on preferences that may persist over long periods even in the 
subsequent absence of the incentives (we reserve the term endogenous preferences for these 
durable learning effects). Our penultimate section surveys studies in which crowding in 
occurs. We conclude with some implications for policy and institutional design.  
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2. Incentives and social preferences as complements or substitutes 
Consider an individual who may bear a cost to take an action that confers benefits on 
others. Taking the action may be encouraged by a subsidy or other explicit incentives (namely 
those that affect the expected material costs and benefits associated with the action.) Citizens 
also have "values" that may motivate taking pro-social actions, the term encompassing both 
ethical commitments and other-regarding preferences such as altruism. Where separability 
does not hold, there are some interaction effects between values and explicit incentives and 
the behavioral effects of these values may be influenced (positively or negatively) by the use 
of explicit incentives.  
To see how, assume that for a given individual the extent the action (denoted by a) and 
both explicit incentives (s) and the intensity of values (λ0) can be represented by a single 
number. Then we describe their interrelationships by a function governing the individual's 
choice of an action: a* = μ( s, λ0). Separability means that the effect of varying each of the 
arguments of μ is independent of the level of the other argument.  
Non-separability may be either marginal (the effect of incentives on values depending 
continuously on the extent of the former) or categorical (the presence of incentives affecting 
values independently of their level) or a combination of the two. The presence of these 
discontinuous effects requires a more general definition of separability than the standard one, 
namely that the cross-partial derivative of μ( s, λ0 ) be zero. Letting Δs and Δλ0 represent 
arbitrary changes in incentives and values, separability implies that ΔT, the effect on a* of 
varying both s and λ0 is equal to ΔS, the sum of the effects of varying each separately where  
(1) ΔT ≡ μ( s+Δs, λ0+ Δλ0 ) - μ( s,λ0 ) and  
 ΔS ≡ μ( s+Δs, λ0 ) + μ( s, λ0+ Δλ0 ) - 2μ( s, λ0 )  
Where ΔT > ΔS then incentives and social preferences are synergistic and are termed 
complements. Where the reverse is true the two arguments are substitutes (or are said to 
exhibit “negative synergy” or “crowding out”). Table 1 summarizes the relevant definitions 
and gives terms commonly used to refer to violations of separability. 
     [Table 1 here] 
For simplicity, we study a single member of a community (indexed by j) who may 
contribute to a public project by taking an action aj at a cost g(aj) that is increasing and convex 
in its argument. The output of the project is available in equal measure to all, and it varies 
positively and linearly with A, the sum of the n members’ contributions, according to φ(A). 
The explicit incentive designed by a social planner (s ≥0) is a payment to the individual that is 
proportional to the amount the individual contributes (known to the planner).  
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We express the individual's values as an addition to utility that is proportional to the 
level of contribution, and (ignoring the individual’s superscript) we make explicit the sources 
of non-separability as: 
(2) v = a λ0(1+ 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2s) 
where the indicator function 1{s>0} = 1 if s > 0 and zero otherwise. In section 5 we study the 
manner in which incentives constitute part of the environment in which individuals update 
their preferences, and we extend this representation of the contemporaneous effects of 
incentives to include cases in which the λ’s depend on past values of s.   In equation (2) as 
before λ0 ≥ 0 measures the intensity of values, λ1 (which may be of either sign) measures the 
categorical effect of the presence of an incentive on values that is independent of the level of 
the incentive, and λ2 (which also may be of either sign) measures the marginal (rather than 
categorical) effect of variations in s on values. The individual's utility is thus 
(3) u = φ(A) - g(a) + a (s + λ0(1 + 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2 s)) 
and the individual's utility maximizing contribution (a*) equates the marginal cost of 
contributing to the marginal benefits, or:  
(4) g'(a*) = φ + s + λ0(1 + 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2 s)  
Assuming that g(a) is just ½(a)2 so as to permit a closed form expression for the individual's 
choice of contribution we have:  
(5) a* = μ( s, λ0 ) = φ + s + λ0(1+ 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2 s) 
and the effect of variations in s on the individual’s actions is given by 
(6) Δa* = Δs (1 + λ0λ2) + 1{s=0}λ0λ1 
 Then using the fact that 1{s=0} + 1{s>0} = 1 we have 
(7) ΔT = (φ + s + Δs + ( λ0 +Δλ0 )( 1+λ1 + λ2( s +Δs ))) - (φ + s + λ0(1 +1{s>0}λ1 +λ2 s))  
   = Δs (1+ λ0 λ2) + Δλ0 (1 +λ1 +λ2 s) + Δλ0Δsλ2 + 1{s=0}λ0λ1 
(8) ΔS = (φ + s +Δs + λ0(1+λ1+ λ2( s + Δs ))) + (φ + s + ( λ0 + Δλ0 )(1+ 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2 s))  
 - 2( φ + s + λ0(1+ 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2 s)) 
    = Δs (1+ λ0 λ2) + Δλ0 (1 +1{s>0}λ1 +λ2 s) + λ01{s=0}λ1 
Equality of ΔT and ΔS and hence separability obtains if 
 (9) ΔT - ΔS = Δλ0 (Δsλ2 +1{s=0}λ1) = 0 
In (9) the first term in the parenthesis captures non-additivity due to marginal non-separability 
and the second, non-additivity due to categorical non-separability. Figure 1 illustrates the two 
forms of non-separability. 
[Figure 1 here] 
Using (6) we say that a particular change in incentives Δs has crowded out values if 
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Δa*/Δs < 1, and conversely for the case of crowding in. Strong crowding out holds if  
Δa*/Δs < 0. Note that crowding out does not require that the effect of the incentive be 
negative, only that it be less than would be the case if additivity held. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1 where for s > s′ the incentive has a positive effect on contributions (compared to s = 
0) in the presence of either marginal (non-strong) crowding out or categorical crowding out. 
A recent experiment allows an estimate of both categorical and marginal crowding out. 
Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008) implemented a public goods experiment in which the 192 
German students faced three conditions: no incentives to contribute and a bonus given to the 
highest contributing individual that was either high or low (details are in Table 2, results are 
shown in Figure 2). In the no-incentive case contributions averaged 48 percent above the 
Nash equilibrium (25) that would have occurred if the participants had been motivated only 
by the material rewards of the public project. Contributions in the low-bonus case were not 
significantly different from the no-bonus treatment. In the high-bonus case significantly 
higher contributions occurred, but the amount contributed barely (and insignificantly) differed 
from that predicted for self-regarding subjects. 
[Figure 2 here] 
In Figure 2 we use the observed behavior in the high and low bonus case to estimate the 
marginal effect of the bonus, finding that a unit increase in the bonus is associated with a 0.31 
increase in contributions. This contrasts with the marginal effect of 0.42 that would have 
occurred under separability. Crowding out thus affected a 26 percent reduction in the 
marginal effect of the incentive. The estimated response to the incentive also gives us the 
level of categorical crowding out, namely the observed contributions (37.04) minus the 
predicted contributions had an arbitrarily small incentive been in effect (the vertical intercept 
of the observed line in figure 2) or 34.56. The incentive thus categorically crowded out 21 
percent of the effect of social preferences (measured by the excess in contribution levels 
above Nash equilibrium for self interested subjects, 12.04.)  
Categorical crowding out is also evident in three experiments by Heyman and Ariely 
(2004). For example reported willingness to help a stranger load a sofa into a van was much 
lower under a small money incentive than with no incentive at all, yet a moderate incentive 
increased the willingness to help (over the no incentive condition). Using these data as we did 
in the Irlenbusch and Ruchala study, we estimate that the mere presence of the incentive 
reduced the willingness to help by 27 percent (compared to the no incentive condition).  
Cardenas (2004) also implemented an experiment that allows us to estimate both 
categorical and marginal crowding, but here (as in some other experiments) we observe 
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categorical crowding in. He implemented a Common Pool Resource Game in which 
individuals choose how much to withdraw from a mutually beneficial common pool 
analogous to a forest. The subjects, a group of Colombian users of rural ecosystems, faced 
three conditions: no incentives, and a fine for overexploitation of the “forest” that could be 
either very high or low with a 20 percent probability of being monitored (details are in Table 
3, results are shown in Figure 3). In the no-incentive case the average level of extraction was 
44 percent below the Nash equilibrium that would have occurred if the participants had been 
motivated only by the material rewards of extracting from the common pool (8). The level of 
extraction in the low-fine case was significantly different from the no-fine treatment and 55 
percent below the Nash equilibrium of self-interested subjects. The high-fine induced a small 
but statistically significantly further reduction in extractions, but the amount extracted was 34 
percent above the Nash equilibrium predicted for self-regarding subjects. The high fine 
produced anti-social behavior: subjects sacrificed individual gain in order to over-exploit the 
forest.  
In Figure 3 we show the predicted outcomes for self-regarding subjects (the red dashed 
line) and for hypothetical subjects with the level of other-regarding preferences observed in 
the no incentive condition and with separable preferences (the solid blue line). We use the 
observed behavior in the high and low fine case to estimate a constant marginal effect of the 
fine, finding that a unit increase in the fine is associated with a 0.002 decrease in extractions. 
This contrasts with the marginal decrease of 0.04 that would have occurred under separability. 
Crowding out thus reduced the marginal effect of the incentive expected under separability by 
95 percent. The estimated response to the incentive also gives us an estimate of categorical 
crowding, namely the difference between the level of extraction in the no incentive condition 
(4.5) and the predicted level of extraction had an arbitrarily small incentive been in effect (the 
vertical intercept of the observed line in figure 3) or 2.82). Thus while the marginal effect of 
the fine was essentially zero, its mere presence appears to have augmented social preferences 
by 48 percent (measured by the increase in the extent under-extraction levels below self 
interested Nash equilibrium in the presence of the fine by comparison to that observed in the 
no incentive condition). In this case the fine did not work as an incentive, but in Cardenas’ 
view rather as a signal alerting subjects to the public good nature of the interaction.  Related 
results are reported in section 7. 
[Figure 3 here] 
Many experiments provide evidence of strong crowding out but cannot distinguish the 
blunted marginal incentives of marginal crowding out from additivity or even crowding in. 
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The reason is that unlike the Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008) and Cardenas (2004) studies, they 
do not establish the response to incentives that would be observed under separability and thus 
are able to detect only strong crowding out (based on the sign of the effect) and not weak 
(based on the size of the effect). Thus had Cardenas implemented only the low fine, the level 
of extraction based on the social preferences observed in the no incentive condition (4.5) plus 
the additive marginal effect of the incentives (for a self interested individual) would have 
almost exactly predicted the low fine contribution, apparently confirming separability.  A 
common misinterpretation of these experiments is that Δa*/Δs > 0, as was found in the 
Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008) experiment or similar findings that an incentive had an effect 
in the intended direction, is evidence against crowding out (Rigdon (2009)). 
What are the cognitive or affective effects of incentives that explain the categorical and 
marginal crowding out observed in this and other experiments? Few experiments have thus far 
been designed to answer this question, so the inferences that we draw in the next four sections 
must be provisional. The experimental methods that have become standard in economics 
include playing for real stakes, excluding deception, and making explicit use of game 
theoretic concepts to clarify the role of incentives. As experimental methods differ 
considerably across disciplines, and for reasons of space we limit the entries in the tables to 
experiments done by economists, although we are concerned we may be missing relevant 
literature provided by other disciplines. All of those studies include baselines to ascertain 
whether the incentives led to changes in subject’s decisions. We refer to a number of 
important experiments done using other methods in the text. 
 
3. Incentives provide information 
Incentives are implemented for a purpose, and because the purpose is often evident to 
the target of the incentives, the target may also infer information about the person who 
designed the incentive, about his or her beliefs concerning the target, and the nature of the 
task to be done (Benabou and Tirole (2003), Fehr and Rockenbach (2003)). We will illustrate 
this incentives-as-signals mechanism by the contrasting positive response to fines imposed by 
peers in public goods experiments and negative response to fines imposed by experimental 
‘investors’ and ‘employers’ in a principal agent experiment. 
German students in the role of "investor" chose a costly action benefiting the other 
player, called the "trustee," who, knowing the investor’s choice, could in turn provide a 
personally costly “back-transfer,” returning a benefit to the investor (Fehr and Rockenbach 
(2003).) When the investor transferred money to the trustee, he or she also specified a desired 
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level of the back-transfer. The experimenters implemented an incentive condition in which the 
investor had the option of declaring that he would impose a fine if the trustee’s back-transfer 
were less than the desired amount. The investor could also decline the use of the fine, the 
choice of using or declining the fine option being taken prior to the trustee’s decision. There 
was also a “trust” condition in which no such incentives were available to the investor.  
Trustees reciprocated generous initial transfers by investors with greater back transfers. 
But the use of the fine reduced return transfers conditional on the investor’s transfer, while 
renouncing the use of the fine when it was available to the investor increased back transfers. 
Only one-third of the investors renounced the fine; their payoffs were 50 percent greater than 
the investors who threatened use of the fines.  
The proximate causes of the negative impact of incentives in this case are suggested by 
evidence on the neural responses of the trustees in a Trust Game (Li, et al. (2008).) As in the 
experiment of Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) the investor’s threat of sanctions negatively 
affected back transfers by trustees. To identify the proximate causes of this result, Li and his 
co-authors used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare the activation of 
distinct brain regions of trustees when faced with an investor who had threatened to sanction 
the trustee for insufficient back transfers and an investor who had not threatened a sanction. 
Threatened sanctions de-activated the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (VMPFC, a brain area 
correlated with higher repayment in this experiment) as well as other areas relating to the 
processing of social rewards. The threat activated the parietal cortex, an area thought to be 
associated with cost-benefit analysis and other self-interested optimizing. The interpretation 
by Li and his co authors is that the sanctions induced a “perception shift” favoring a more 
self-interested response. 
The signaling interpretation suggested by Fehr and Rockenbach is that in the trust 
condition, or when the fine was renounced by the investor, a large initial transfer signaled that 
the investor trusted the trustee. The positive response of the trustee is a categorical effect, 
analogous to the negative categorical effect of the use of incentives described above. The 
threat of the fine, however, conveyed a different message and extinguished the trustee’s 
reciprocity. This was especially the case when it appeared that the intent of the fine was to 
impose what the trustee considered to be an unfair outcome. Where the investor had 
announced modest levels of desired returns such that the investor and the trustee would both 
substantially share in the benefits, the use of the fines reduced back transfers by an 
insignificant 8 percent. But where the announced desired back-transfer would have allowed 
the investor to capture most of the benefits had the trustee complied, the reduction in back 
 12
transfers was 38 percent. It appears that the use of the fine in these conditions signaled the 
unfair intent of the investor, rather than simply his distrust of the trustee.  
The fact that in this latter case incentives revealed that the principal is untrusting or self-
aggrandizing helps explain the contrasting effect of incentives imposed by peers who do not 
stand to benefit personally. An example is the Public Goods experiment in which fellow 
group members have the opportunity to reduce their own payoffs in order to punish (reduce 
the payoffs of) others in their group once each member's contributions are revealed. In this 
experiment group membership is shuffled so that a punisher could not benefit from the target's 
response in subsequent periods. Punishment thus is an altruistic act as it benefits others at the 
expense of the punisher and hence it cannot be interpreted as a signal of unfair intent. In this 
setting there is a strong positive response by low contributors (Fehr and Gachter (2000), Fehr 
and Gaechter (2002a), Masclet, et al. (2003)).  
Although there is no direct evidence, a plausible explanation of the effectiveness of 
incentives imposed on low contributors by peers at a personal cost to themselves is that when 
punished, those who have contributed less than others interpret the punishment as a signal of 
public-spirited social disapproval and feel shame, which they redress by subsequently 
contributing more. In this  case the incentive (prospect of peer imposed fines) has crowded in 
social preferences, a possibility we return to in section 7. Table 2 summarizes experiments in 
which this incentives-as-signals effect appears to have been at work (in some cases along with 
other mechanisms, to which we now turn.) 
[Table 2 here] 
4. Incentives may suggest appropriate behavior 
In most situations people look for clues of appropriate behavior (Ross and Nisbett 
(1991), Salant and Rubinstein (2008), Tversky and Kahneman (1981)) and incentives often 
provide them.  In Table 3 we survey experiments in which this appears to have been the case. 
[Table 3 here] 
 Hoffman, et al. (1994) illustrated the power of names: generosity and fair-minded 
behavior were diminished by simply re-labeling an Ultimatum Game the “Exchange Game” 
and re-labeling proposers and responders “sellers” and “buyers”. The power of names has 
been confirmed in many (but not all) experiments since then (cited in Ellingsen, et al. (2008), 
Rege and Telle (2004), Zhong, Loewenstein and Murnighan (2007)).  
 But literally naming the game is not necessary. Incentives alone may provide powerful 
frames for the decision maker. Schotter, Weiss and Zapater (1996) found that market-like 
competition for “survival” among subjects reduced their concern for fairness in an Ultimatum 
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Game experiment. In this game Player 1 is given an endowment and asked to propose a 
division of it with Player 2. Player 2, knowing the size of the endowment, decides whether to 
accept or reject the division. If Player 2 accepts, then the proposed division is implemented. If 
Player 2 rejects both players receive zero. When subjects were told that those with lower 
earnings would be excluded from a second round of the game, those in the role of Player 1 
offered less generous amounts to Player 2, and Player 2 accepted lower offers. The authors’ 
interpretation was that: “...the competition inherent in markets...offers justifications for 
actions that, in isolation, would be unjustifiable.” While plausible, direct evidence for this 
“crowding out of ethical reasoning” explanation is lacking because the social preferences that 
accounted for fair behavior in the non-survival condition were not measured. There are cases, 
however, in which the reduction in the salience of ethical reasoning induced by the presence 
of incentives can be identified. An example follows. 
A large team of anthropologists and economists implemented both Dictator and  
Third Party Punishment Games in 15 societies ranging from Amazonian, Arctic and African 
hunter gatherers to manufacturing workers in Accra, Ghana and U.S undergraduates (Barr, et 
al. (2009), Henrich, et al. (2009).) In the Dictator Game an experimental subject is assigned a 
sum of money and asked to allocate some all or none of it to a passive recipient. The Third 
Party Punishment Game is a Dictator Game with an active onlooker (the third party) who 
observes the dictator’s allocation. If the third party deems the dictator’s allocation worthy of 
punishment he or she may then pay to impose a monetary fine on the dictator. Though one 
would expect that the dictators in the presence of a third party would adjust their allocations 
upwards (compared to the two party game) so as to avoid being fined, fining was common; it 
occurred in 30% of the interactions across the study sites.  
 Surprisingly, in only two of the 15 populations were the offers significantly higher in 
the Third Party Punishment Game than in the Dictator Game, and in four of the populations 
the allocations were significantly (and in some cases substantially) lower. In Accra, for 
example, where 41 percent of the dictator’s allocations resulted in fines by the third party, the 
allocations were 30 per cent lower (t = -6.8) in the Third Party Punishment Game than in the 
Dictator Game. The incentives provided by the fine did not induce higher allocations, but 
rather had the opposite effect. (The fact that for two groups there was a significant positive 
effect of the fine option indicates that the incentive had some effect, but as we have seen does 
not preclude crowding out.) 
 Crowding out of ethical motives is suggested by the fact that the dictator’s adherence 
to one of the worlds religion (Islam or Christianity, including Russian Orthodoxy) raised 
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allocations in the Dictator Game by 23 percent (t = 3.5, compared to those unaffiliated with a 
world religion). In the Third Party Punishment Game with the very same individuals the 
estimated religion effect was one tenth as large and was not significantly different form zero. 
In the Accra sample the Dictator’s allocation was increasing in the frequency of attendance at 
church or mosque in the two party game; but this “religion effect” vanished in the Third Party 
Punishment Game. The presence of the incentive based on the fine appears to have defined 
the setting as one in which the moral teachings of these religions were not relevant.  
  
5. Incentives may compromise intrinsic motives and self-determination 
A rich experimental and theoretical literature (and ongoing debate) in psychology has 
explored the crowding out of intrinsic motives (Cameron, Banko and Pierce (2001), Deci, 
Koestner and Ryan (1999), Deci and Ryan (1985).) Recent experiments by economists 
surveyed in Table 4 as well as non-experimental studies in economics (surveyed in Frey and 
Jegen (2001)) provide evidence for a third reason for the self interest and other regarding 
preferences may be substitutes rather than additive or complements. The underlying 
psychological mechanism appears to be a fundamental desire for “feelings of competence and 
self-determination” that are associated with intrinsically motivated behavior (Deci (1975)). 
According to this interpretation, where people derive pleasure from an action per se in the 
absence of other rewards, the introduction of explicit incentives may 'over-justify' the activity 
and reduce the individual's sense of autonomy. 
[Table 4 here] 
Consistent with this “self-determination” model, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) used a Gift 
Exchange Game to explore the idea that ‘control aversion’ may be a reason why incentives 
degrade performance. Experimental agents in a role similar to an employee chose a level of 
‘production’ that was costly to them and beneficial to the principal (the employer). The 
agent's choice effectively determined the distribution of gains between the two, with the 
agent’s maximum payoff occurring if he produced nothing. Before the agent's decision, the 
principal could elect to leave the choice of the level of production completely to the agent's 
discretion, or impose a lower bound on the agent's production (three bounds were varied by 
the experimenter across treatments, the principal’s choice was simply whether or not to 
impose it.) The principal could infer that a self-regarding agent would perform at the lower 
bound or, in the absence of the bound, at zero, and thus imposition of the bound would 
maximize the principal’s payoffs. 
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But in the experiment agents chose a lower level of production when the principal 
imposed the bound. Apparently anticipating this response, fewer than a third of the principals 
opted for its imposition in the moderate or low bound treatments. This minority of 
“untrusting” principals earned on average half of the profits of those who did not seek to 
control the agents' choice in the low bound treatment, and a third less in the intermediate 
bound condition. 
Control aversion and the desire for self-determination are not the only effects of the 
principal’s seeking to bind the agent. As anticipated by our discussion of the information 
content of incentives above, the imposition of the minimum in this experiment gave the 
agents remarkably accurate information about the principals' beliefs concerning the agents. In 
post-play interviews, most agents agreed with the statement that the imposition of the lower 
bound was a signal of distrust and those who imposed the bound in fact had substantially 
lower expectations of the agents. Their consequent attempt to control the agents' choices 
induced over half of the agents (in all three treatments) to contribute minimally, thereby 
affirming the principals' pessimism. Depending on the distribution of principal’s priors about 
the agents, a population with preferences similar to these experimental subjects could support 
both trusting and untrusting (Pareto-inefficient) equilibria.  
 
6. Incentives alter the environment in which new preferences are learned 
Incentives may also affect long-term change in motivations because they alter key 
aspects of how we acquire our motivations including both the range of alternative preferences 
to which one is exposed and the economic rewards and social status of those with preferences 
different from one's own (Bar-Gill and Fershtman (2005), Bisin and Verdier (2001), Bowles 
(2004)). For example, suppose the relevant incentives allow the self-regarding to exploit the 
civic-minded. Then if the learning process is payoff-monotonic the civic-minded are likely to 
be eliminated. Other effects are less obvious: a competitive market with complete contracts 
leaves little scope for acting on ethical, reciprocal or generous preferences, even among those 
so inclined (Sobel (2007)). If preference change is closely related to exposure to alternative 
models as overwhelming evidence suggests (Zajonc (1968)), then this idealized market 
environment would provide little basis for the proliferation of non-self-regarding preferences.  
 Experiments of at most a few hours duration are unlikely to uncover the causal 
mechanisms involved in preference change. This is because adopting new preferences is often 
a slow process more akin to acquiring an accent than to choosing an action in a game. The 
developmental processes involved typically include population-level effects such as 
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conformism, schooling, religious instruction and other forms of socialization that are not 
readily captured in experiments. Acquiring new preferences (like accents) often takes place 
early in the life cycle is strongly attenuated thereafter.  
 However, historical, anthropological, social psychological and other data (surveyed in 
Bowles (1998)) provide evidence for endogenous preferences, showing that economic 
structures affect parental child rearing values, personality traits rewarded by higher grades in 
school, and other developmental influences. Additional evidence comes from the 
experimental studies of 15 small scale societies with extraordinarily varied economic 
structures ranging from farming to hunting and gathering. In these studies cross subject pool 
comparisons showed a strong association between the nature of the diverse economic tasks 
required to secure a livelihood in a society and its members’ behavior in the Ultimatum Game 
(Henrich, et al. (2005)). 
 Despite the limitations of experiments for the investigation of preference change, we 
survey in Table 5 a number of experiments that have documented durable learning effects. In 
many cases the effect of incentives on preferences persists even after incentives are 
withdrawn. Equation (2) can be modified  to examine  these and other cases of  long term 
effects of incentives on social preferences, namely:  
(2a)  v = a λ0(s)(1+ 1{s>0}λ1(s) + s λ2(s))  
where s represents a measure of exposure to  incentives in the past.  An example follows. 
In the public goods experiment designed by Falkinger, et al. (2000) an incentive system 
induced subjects to contribute almost exactly the amount predicted for a own-material-payoff-
maximizing individual, while in the absence of the incentive subjects contributed significantly 
more than would have been optimal for a payoff maximizing individual. But subjects who had 
previously experienced the incentive system contributed 26 per cent less than those who had 
never experienced it.  
[Table 5 here] 
7. Incentives and social preferences as complements 
Crowding in may also occur. In Table 6 we survey a number of studies that show this 
result. We have already seen that fines imposed on free riders by altruistic peers in a Public 
Goods Game induce higher levels of contribution in subsequent rounds of play. Of course 
crowding in need not have been involved; individuals might have simply best-responded to 
the anticipated loss in payoffs associated with low contributions. But more than this appears 
to be at work.  Consistent with the interpretation that incentives imposed by peers activate 
shame, purely verbal messages of disapproval have a substantial positive effect on free riders’ 
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subsequent contributions (Barr (2001), Masclet, et al. (2003).) When those who have 
contributed more than others are punished (as sometimes occurs, Herrmann, Gaechter and 
Thoni (2008)), they subsequently contribute less, and costly retaliatory punishment 
escalations sometimes result (Bowles and Gintis (2006), Carpenter, et al. (2009), Hopfensitz 
and Reuben (2006).) This appears to occur because the targets of the punishment feel hostility 
rather than shame.  
[Table 6 here] 
Incentives thus may recruit social preferences rather than dampening them. But other 
mechanisms are at work: social norms support the observance of traffic regulations, but these 
may unravel in the absence of state-imposed sanctions on flagrant violators. The rule of law 
and other institutional designs that limit the more extreme forms of anti-social behavior and 
facilitate mutually beneficial interactions on a large scale may enhance the salience of social 
preferences by assuring people that those who conform to moral norms will not be exploited 
by their self-interested fellow citizens.  
This phenomenon may have been at work among the Hokkaido University subjects who 
cooperated more in a public goods experiment when assured that others who did not 
cooperate would be punished (Shinada and Yamagishi (2007)) despite the fact that this had no 
effect on their own material incentives. They apparently wanted to be cooperative but wished 
even more to avoid being the sucker who is exploited by defectors. Market incentives may 
also favor the endogenous evolution of social preferences. In two sets of experiments in 15 
small-scale societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Henrich, et al. (2005), Henrich, et al. 
(2009)), the experience of mutually beneficial exchanges with strangers may explain why, in 
anonymous experimental settings, individuals from the more market-integrated societies gave 
more in the Ultimatum Game.  
A distinct mechanism underlying crowding in was apparently at work in a public goods 
experiment by Galbiati and Vertova (2008b). Consistent with the Cardenas experiment 
presented in figure 3, they found that the effect of a stated (non-binding) obligation to 
contribute a certain amount was greater when it was combined with a weak monetary 
incentive than when no incentives were offered. The monetary incentives had no effect on 
behavior in the absence of the stated obligation. The authors’ interpretation is that the explicit 
incentives enhanced the salience of the stated obligation.  
 
8. Conclusions: Puzzles and lessons  
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While competing interpretations are plausible for many of these experiments it would 
nonetheless be difficult, in light of these data, to sustain the implicit separability assumption 
adopted in many economic models. The most plausible explanation for the failure of the 
separability assumption is that when people engage in trade, produce goods and services, save 
and invest they are not only attempting to get things, they are also trying to be someone, both 
in their own eyes and in the eyes of others. Incentives addressed to our acquisitive desires 
appear to dampen or impede the pursuit of our constitutive aspirations. Among the reasons, 
we have seen are that in addition to affecting the costs and benefits of an action, incentives 
also provide information about the person imposing the incentive, suggest appropriate 
behavior by framing decision situations, may compromise the target’s sense of autonomy, 
alter the environments in which we learn new preferences, and alter beliefs about what other 
agents will do.  
This may explain why incentives for settlement of conflicts may fail. Representative 
samples of Jewish West Bank settlers in 2005, Palestinian refugees in 2005, and Palestinian 
students in 2006 were asked how angry and disgusted they would feel or how supportive to 
violence they might be if their political leaders were to compromise on contested issues 
between the groups. Those who regarded their group’s claims (on Jerusalem, for example) as 
reflecting “sacred values” (about half in each of the three groups) expressed far greater anger, 
disgust and support for violence if the compromise were accompanied by a monetary 
compensation for their own group than if no compensation were offered (Ginges, et al. 
(2007)) Similar results were fund in a survey of the willingness of Swiss citizens to accept 
environmental hazards (Frey and Stutzer (2006).)  
John Stuart Mill (whose definition the boundaries of our discipline we mentioned at the 
outset) and economists since have recognized that the purposes of individual economic action 
are constitutive as well as acquisitive. But what some have missed is that our acquisitive and 
constitutive motivations may not be separable. Jeremy Bentham’s Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), is arguably the first text in what we now call 
public economics. In it he explained how proper incentives might align the private interests of 
officials with their public duties. But he also understood the constitutive side of action and the 
need to design incentives that are complements of the moral sentiments rather than 
substitutes: 
A punishment may be said to be calculated to answer the purpose of a moral lesson, 
when by reason of the ignominy it stamps upon the offence, it is calculated to inspire the 
public with sentiments of aversion towards those pernicious habits and dispositions with 
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which the offence appears to be connected; and thereby to inculcate the opposite 
beneficial habits and dispositions (Bentham (1789): p.26.) 
 
The fact that punishments are “moral lessons” as well as incentives may help resolve 
one of the puzzles in the literature we have just surveyed. In a widely cited natural 
experiment, the imposition of fines on parents arriving late to pick up their children at day 
care centers in Haifa resulted in a doubling of the number of tardy pickups (Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000a)). But the small tax on plastic grocery bags enacted in Ireland in 2002 had 
the opposite effect: it resulted in a 94 percent decline in their use and appeared to crowd in 
pro-social preferences (Rosenthal (2008).). 
The contrast is instructive. In the Haifa case, the experimenters (respecting standard 
experimental protocols) provided no justification for the introduction of the fine on the 
parents, whose occasional lateness could have occurred for reasons beyond the parents’ 
control rather than as the result of a disregard of the inconvenience it caused. Moreover 
lateness was not so common as to be widely broadcast to the other parents. By contrast, the 
introduction of the Irish plastic bag tax was preceded by a substantial publicity campaign, and 
the use of the bags was the result of a simple choice made in a highly public condition. In the 
Irish case, as in the experiment by Galbiati and Vertova (2008b), the monetary incentive was 
introduced jointly with a message of explicit social obligation, and it apparently served as a 
reminder of the larger social costs of the use and disposition of the bags. This contrast, along 
with the fact mentioned above that fines imposed on low contributors by peers in Public 
Goods Games have positive effects while fines imposed by principals on agents often 
backfire, makes it clear that fines and other monetary incentives per se are not the cause of 
crowding out. Rather what is critical is the meaning of the fines as conveyed by the social 
relationships among the actors, the information the fine provides, and the pre-existing 
normative frameworks of the actors.  
 Another lesson for mechanism design is that in implementing public policy or private 
systems of incentives, the designer must consider the response of individuals’ motivations to 
the instruments under consideration and take the predicted policy outcome to be the resulting 
joint equilibrium of preferences and economic allocations. Perhaps surprisingly, the citizen-
utility-maximizing sophisticated planner cognizant of this motivational version of the Lucas 
critique may make either greater or lesser use of explicit incentives when crowding out occurs 
(Bowles and Hwang (2008), Fershtman and Heifetz (2006), Heifetz, Segev and Talley 
(2007).)  
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Figures 
 Action (a) 
 s’ 
φ + λ0 
Categorical crowding out 
 (λ1<0, λ2=0) 
a =φ + s + λ0(1+ λ1) 
Incentive (s) 
φ + λ0(1+ λ1) 
Strong (marginal) crowding out 
(λ0λ2<-1, λ1=0) 
a = φ + λ0 + s (1+ λ0λ2) 
φ  
Self-regarding 
contribution  
(λ0=λ1=λ2=0) 
a = φ + s 
Marginal crowding out 
(λ2<0, λ1=0) 
a = φ + λ0 +s (1+ λ0λ2) 
Separability 
(λ1= λ2=0) 
a =φ + λ0+ s 
 
Figure 1. Citizen's contribution to the public good (a*) under non-separability of incentives and values. Shown are examples 
of equation (5) under varying separability assumptions. Under separability (top line) categorical and marginal incentive 
effects are additive. Under strong crowding out the use of the incentive is counterproductive; this holds for all levels of s 
under the marginal crowding out function shown. Under categorical crowding out, incentives less than s' are also 
counterproductive in the sense that contributions are less than they would have been in the absence of incentives.  
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Figure 2. Categorical and marginal crowding out (from Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008)). Source: see text. The experimental 
design is an adapted Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game comparing two team-based compensation schemes without 
and with a relative reward (or bonus) for the highest contributor in the team. The bonus is self-funded (each member pays 
one-forth of the bonus). Each subject simultaneously decides an effort level from the interval [0, 120]. 
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Figure 3. Categorical and marginal crowding out (from Cardenas (2004)). Source: see text. The experimental design is an 
adapted Common Pool Resources game comparing an external regulation (without and with a fine). Only 20 percent of the 
players were monitored. Each subject simultaneously decides a level of extraction from the interval [0, 8]. 
 
Tables 
Table 1. Separability and its violations.  
ΔT = ΔS  Separability, additivity 
ΔT > ΔS  Complementarity, synergy, super-modularity, crowding in  
ΔT < ΔS  Substitutability, negative synergy, sub-modularity, crowding out 
 
Tables 2 to 6. 
Note: The bold entries F, S, E and C indicate that the experiment in question could also have 
been included in tables 3 (Framing) 4 (Self-determination) 5 (Endogenous preferences) or 6 
(Complementary relations between incentives and social preferences). In those tables I 
indicate that the experiment could have been included in this table (Information). All the 
papers but those marked with an * are published or forthcoming in a publication.  
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Table 2. Incentives provide information (I) 
 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environments 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[01] Ariely, 
Bracha and 
Meier (2009) 
U.S. 
students 
(161) 
Charity giving 
based on task 
performance 
• An external form of enforcement: 
With monetary compensation or 
without; 
• Donation choices are public or 
private 
• Different frames: "good" and 
"bad" charitable causes 
In the public treatment subjects exert more effort 
for a good cause and effort is substantially lower 
in the incentive treatment. Monetary incentives 
increase effort in the private treatment. 
The signaling value of giving is 
compromised by incentives. “Image 
motivation is crowded out by monetary 
incentives [that are] more likely to be 
counterproductive for public pro-social 
activities than for private ones.” (p.1) 
Categorical crowding out. See 
Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999), Mulder, 
et al. (2006) and Upton (1974) 
[02] Irlenbusch 
and Ruchala 
(2008) 
German 
Students 
(192) 
Public Goods 
Game 
• An external form of enforcement: 
Team-based compensation with and 
without a reward for the highest 
contributor in the team 
• The reward is a low or a high 
bonus 
• Pure Individual bonus without 
team-based compensation 
High (but not low) bonuses increase average 
effort, and joint surplus increases significantly 
only if the bonus is high, but decreases over time. 
Only with the purely team-based compensation 
(no individual incentives) do agents contribute 
more than self interest would motivate. Pure 
tournament incentives induce effort levels below 
the selfish Nash equilibrium prediction. 
Both categorical and marginal crowding 
out occur. The tournament structure 
reduces voluntary cooperation. F 
(See text) 
[03] Borges and 
Irlenbusch 
(2007) 
German 
Students 
(179) 
Buyer - Seller 
Game 
• Three rights of withdrawal: none, 
voluntary offer of a right of 
withdrawal (with a return cost for 
the seller) and imposed. 
• The right of withdrawal when 
imposed has a return cost for the 
buyer or not 
When sellers voluntarily offer a withdrawal right, 
buyers make order decisions that are less harmful 
for the seller than if the withdrawal right is 
imposed on sellers exogenously. 
“Buyers are more inclined to behave 
fairly towards the sellers if they have 
granted the withdrawal right voluntarily 
than if it is constituted by law”. (p. 17) 
[because it is] “perceived ...as a generous 
act and they might feel inclined to 
reciprocate by not exploiting the seller. 
…”. (p. 12). F 
[04] Dickenson 
and Villeval 
(2008) 
French 
students 
(182) 
Gift-Exchange 
Game with a 
computer task 
• Stranger or Partner with 
communication  
• Employer payoffs dependent on 
employee effort (variable) or not. 
In the partner treatment, when employer payoffs 
depend on employee effort less monitoring induce 
substantially higher performance. Consistent with 
Frey (1993) 
While intrinsic motivation is evident in 
subject behaviors, in the Partner 
relationship the effect of more 
monitoring appears to be a reciprocity-
based negative response to the 
principal's lack of trust or intent to 
benefit at the agent's expense. F, S  
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Table 2 continued… 
 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environments 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[05] Stanca, 
Bruni and 
Corazzini 
(2007) * 
Italian 
students (96) 
Gift-
Exchange 
Game 
• In the first move, Information 
(player 1 knows there is a second 
move) or No Information (player 1 
does not know there is a second 
move and hence thinks the game is 
a Dictator Game) 
Second movers’ amounts returned are more 
correlated with the first mover’s amounts 
sent in the No Information treatment.  
 
Reciprocity is stronger in response to 
actions that are perceived as driven by 
intrinsic motivation, than to be in response 
to actions that are perceived as extrinsically 
motivated. F 
[06] Tyran and 
Feld (2006) 
Swiss 
students 
(102) 
Public 
Goods 
Game 
• Levels of sanctions: none, mild 
and severe 
• Enforcement: external (i.e. 
experimenter-imposed) or self-
imposed (by referendum) 
Exogenously imposed mild law does not 
significantly affect average contributions to 
the public good. Compliance is much 
improved if mild law is endogenously 
chosen. 
If the enforcement is self-imposed it does 
not indicate hostile intent and also induces 
expectations of others’ cooperation (people 
tend to comply with the law if they expect 
many others to do so). If mild law is 
rejected in the referendum, compliance 
tends to be lower than without the law. F 
[07] Fehr and 
List (2004) 
Costa Rican 
CEOs (126) 
& students 
(76) 
Trust Game • Optional punishment as an 
incentive contract (i.e. a fine if less 
than the desired back-transfer 
amount is returned) 
CEO principals trust more and are more 
trustworthy than students and as a result 
they achieve allocations closer to the 
maximum surplus that could be generated 
by the two parties. Joint surplus is highest 
when the punishment option is available 
and not used and lowest if the punishment 
option is used. 
Key to performance: “the psychological 
message…conveyed by incentives – 
whether ... kind or hostile...” (p. 745). See 
Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) [08]  
[08] Fehr and 
Rockenbach 
(2003)  
German 
students 
(238) 
Trust Game • Optional punishment as a 
incentive contract (i.e. a fine if less 
than the desired back-transfer 
amount is returned) 
Trustee's back-transfers are lower when 
investors impose fines. Not using the 
punishment option when it is available 
results in larger back transfers and a larger 
joint surplus. 
Explicit incentives undermine altruistic 
cooperation and reciprocity; forgoing the 
punishment option is a signal of good will 
and trust. See Fehr and List (2004) [07] 
Negative effects of use of the punishment 
option are greater when the investor 
demands a larger share of the joint surplus. 
Categorical crowding out when the investor 
chooses the fine. F 
[09] Fehr and 
Gaechter 
(2002b) * 
Swiss 
students 
(182) 
Gift-
Exchange 
Game 
• Three external forms of 
enforcement: A Trust (pure fixed 
wage) contract, a price deduction 
(i.e., fine) contract, and bonus 
incentive contract 
Incentives reduce agent’s effort. If the 
incentive is framed as a price deduction the 
effort reduction is greater than where the 
incentive is framed as a bonus. Incentives 
reduce total surplus, increase principal’s 
profits. 
Effects of incentives are due to the 
perceived fairness, kindness and hostility of 
the principal's action. F, S 
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Table 3. Incentives may suggest appropriate behavior (F) 
 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environments 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[10] Henrich, et al. 
(2009) and 
Barr, et al. 
(2009) and 
personal 
communicatio
n from Barr 
and Henrich 
in March 
2009 
15 societies 
Including US 
students, 
African 
workers,  
Amazonian, 
Arctic, and 
African 
Hunter-
gatherers. 
(428) 
Dictator 
Game, 
Ultimatum 
Game and 
Third-Party 
Punishment 
Game (TPG) 
• Differences between societies 
• Subjects played in the following 
sequence keeping their role 
(active or passive): first DG, then 
the UG and finally the TPG (an 
explicit incentive, i.e. fine)  
In the TPG the incentives provided by the fine do 
not induce higher offers, but rather have the 
opposite effect and factors that may influence 
self-interest calculations (i.e. wealth, income and 
household size) are significant predictors of 
allocations (but not in the DG). Membership in a 
‘world religion’ positively associated with offers 
in the DG but not in the TPG 
 
The presence of the fine in the TPG 
appears to have reduced the salience of 
moral reasoning and enhanced subjects 
concerns with their own economic 
needs.  
[11] Ellingsen, et 
al. (2008) * 
Swedish 
students 
(668) 
 
Prisoners’ 
dilemma 
Game 
• Two labels: Community Game 
and the Stock Market Game 
• Two types of interactions: 
human - human and human – 
computer (opponent’s choice of 
action is made by a computer that 
is programmed to play with the 
same frequency as do subjects in 
the human - human treatment) 
Cooperation is higher with the Community Game 
label than the Stock Market game label in the 
human-human interaction. There is no such effect 
in the human –computer interaction: there is no 
labeling effect when subjects play against an 
opponent who is unaware of the game, although 
the opponent’s action is guaranteed to be 
statistically identical to the actions of an informed 
opponent.  
Cooperative label does not suffice to 
increase cooperation. People respond to 
labels because the label affects how 
others interpret their behavior, which in 
turn determines their image. “people’s 
behavior is constantly sensitive to whom 
they are interacting with and what these 
opponents will do and think” (p. 8). See 
Zhong, et al. (2007), Ross and Samuels 
(1993), Ross and Ward (1996)  
 
[12] 
Galbiati and 
Vertova 
(2008b) 
Italian 
students 
(210) 
Public Goods 
Game (and a 
Lottery 
Game) 
• Different levels of the obligated 
contribution (zero, low and high) 
with a low level of explicit 
incentives (i.e. a probability of 
monitoring and a probabilistic 
penalty or reward) 
When the obligated contribution required is high, 
cooperation is significantly higher than in 
presence of low or null obligation, despite the 
material incentives being identical in these cases. 
Obligations (i.e. what formal rules ask 
people to do) affect behavior 
independently of economic incentives. I 
[13] Li, et al. 
(2008) * 
US citizens 
(104) 
Trust Game • Optional punishment as an 
incentive contract (i.e. a monetary 
sanction if less than the desired 
back-transfer amount is returned) 
Trustees reciprocate relatively less when facing 
sanction threats, and the presence of sanctions 
significantly reduces trustee’s brain activities 
involved in social reward valuation (VMPFC, 
LOFC, and amygdala), while simultaneously 
significantly increasing activities in parietal 
cortex previously implicated in economic 
decision making. 
Monetary sanctions “encourage activity 
within neural networks associated with 
self-interested economic decision 
making while simultaneously mitigating 
activity in networks implicated in social 
reward evaluation and processing” (p. 3) 
I 
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 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environments 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[14] Mellstrom 
and 
Johannesson 
(2008) 
Swedish 
students 
(262) 
Subjects are 
offered to 
carry out the 
health exam to 
become blood 
donors 
• With and without a monetary 
compensation for becoming 
blood donors 
• To choose between a 
monetary compensation and 
donating the same amount to 
charity 
The incentive reduces the supply of 
prospective blood donors from 52% to 
30% among women. No effect among 
men. Allowing individuals to donate the 
payment to charity eliminates the 
negative effect of the monetary 
compensation. 
The monetary incentive may make it more 
difficult to signal social preferences, 
diminishing the signaling value of 
contributing. Charity option facilitates 
signaling. Over-justification appears also to be 
involved. See Upton (1974). I 
[15] Bohnet and 
Baytelman 
(2007) 
Senior 
executives 
in U.S. 
(353) 
Trust Game 
and a Dictator 
Game (for 
trustors the 
transfer is 
tripled and for 
trustees the 
transfer does 
not change) 
• No communication, face-to-
face pre-play communication 
or post-play communication 
• An external form of 
enforcement (Post-play 
monetary punishment or not) 
• Stranger and Partner 
Repetition and communication increase 
amount sent and returned; the option of 
punishment for low offers reduces offers 
of other-regarding trustees (those who 
send more in the Dictator Game) 
 
"The availability of punishment destroys 
intrinsic trust and lowers people’s willingness 
to reward trust" (p.1) I 
[16] Houser, et al. 
(2008) 
U.S. 
students 
(532) 
Gift-Exchange 
Game 
• A form of enforcement 
(Punishment as an incentive 
contract (i.e. a fine)) 
• Intention treatment: 
Punishment is assigned 
exhogenously or imposed by 
investors 
When back-transfer requests are high in 
relation to the sanction’s size, regardless 
of whether the request is fair and 
regardless of whether punishment is 
intentional, punishment incentives have 
detrimental effects on the amount 
returned. 
"Subjects interpret punishment as the price for 
self-interested behavior and the price, 
regardless of whether it was intentionally 
imposed, is an excuse for selfishness" (p.15) 
Categorical crowding out when the investor 
chooses the fine. See Fehr and Rockenbach 
(2003) [08] and Mulder, et al. (2006) I 
[17] Fischbacher, 
Fong and 
Fehr (2005) * 
Swiss 
students 
(238) 
Ultimatum 
Game 
• Buyer competition (one, two 
or five Responders) 
• Seller competition (one or 
two Proposers) 
Buyer competition reduces mean 
accepted offers and buyers' willingness to 
reject. 
Buyer competition makes punishment of 
'unfair' offers less certain (buyers’ 
expectations about other buyers' acceptance is 
less certain). Competition among responders 
appears frame the interaction as market-like. S 
[18] Cardenas 
(2004) 
Colombian 
users of 
rural 
ecosystems 
(265) 
Common Pool 
Resource 
Game 
• Different levels of external 
enforcement (weak and 
strong) with announcement of 
socially optimal extraction 
level and without 
communication 
• Communication without 
fines and announcement. 
Deviation from self interested behavior is 
much greater under communication (no 
fine) than under either high or low fines 
without communication. The behavioral 
effect of high (compared to low) fines is 
less than 6 percent of the predicted effect 
assuming self -regarding. 
Regardless the cost of the regulation (high or 
low), 40 percent of decisions would 
implement the social optimum, 30%  are close 
to the social optimum and 15% are equivalent 
to the self-regarding prediction.  Regulation 
has no marginal effect.Individuals consider 
the norm of cooperation that is proposed 
externally [the announced optimal level] when 
extracting (p. 238). C (See text) 
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 Citation Subjects 
(number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environments 
(treatments) 
Results relevant to separability Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[19] Heyman 
and Ariely 
(2004) 
 
240 US 
students  
(150+90) 
 
 
A 
computer 
task and a 
puzzle task 
 
• Different forms of 
compensation (cash, candy or a 
cash-denominated amount of 
candy)  
• Different levels of monetary 
compensation (none, low, 
medium) 
Effort in both the cash and the candy 
conditions increases when the compensation 
level increases from low to medium. Effort 
in the no-compensation treatment is higher 
than the low- compensation condition for 
both the cash and the cash in terms of candy 
conditions and is not different from low-
compensation in the candy condition. 
Performance from no-compensation to low-
compensation conditions decreases only 
with monetary exchange mechanisms. 
The level and form of compensation affect 
performance. “Monetary compensation may act as 
a strong signal invoking norms of money markets 
instead of social-market relations” (p. 6)  
Monetary incentives influence the ways in which 
tasks are framed and the motivation to engage in 
them. The type of market in which the exchange 
takes place influences the relationship between 
reward and motivation. I 
[20] Cardenas, 
Stranlund 
and Willis 
(2000) 
Colombian 
forest area 
dwellers 
(112) 
Common 
Pool 
Resource 
Game 
• External enforcement device 
with a weak inspection and a 
fine 
• Communication 
Fines induce more self-interested behavior 
and common pool over-exploitation. Socially 
optimal deviations from the selfish Nash 
equilibrium behavior (and the implied 
foregone payoffs by subjects) are least under 
the fines. 
Weakly (exogenously) enforced fines diminish 
socially motivated behavior. Fine appear to have 
induced a shift from moral to self interested frame. 
See Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) 
[21] Schotter, 
et al. 
(1996) 
U.S. 
students 
(247) 
Ultimatum 
Game; 
Dictator 
Game 
• Survival treatment (two-
stage): subjects with higher 
payoffs “survive” to proceed to 
stage 2. 
• Non survival treatment (one 
stage): the proposer is randomly 
assigned 
• Contextual framing: a 
simultaneous move-normal or a 
sequential extensive form game 
Competitive threats to survival induce lower 
offers, and in the UG fewer rejections of 
low offers. 
 
  
The context affects behavior: 'earning' right to be 
the first mover or threat to survival induces 
proposers to behave in a more self-regarding 
manner. “…the competition inherent in markets 
and the need to survive offers justifications for 
actions that, in isolation, would be unjustifiable”. 
(p.38) S  
[22] Hoffman, 
et al. 
(1994) 
U.S. 
students 
(270) 
Ultimatum 
Game; 
Dictator 
Game 
• Roles are assigned by contest 
(the right to be the Proposer is 
'earned' or randomly assigned). 
• Different frame: “Exchange” 
game (between a “seller” and a 
“buyer”) or no frame 
• Anonymity: Double blind or 
not 
Offers are lower and fewer low offers are 
rejected in an exchange context or when the 
proposer earns the right to his role. 
Proposers accurately gauge willingness of 
responders to accept lower offers. Dictators 
send lower amounts in double blind. 
Institutional cues affect behavior: with property 
rights (i.e. legitimate 'earning' right to be 
proposer), a market framing or total anonymity 
proposers and responders are more self-regarding. 
S 
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 Citation Subjects 
(number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environments 
(treatments) 
Results relevant to separability Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[23] Herrmann 
and Orzen 
(2008) 
 
British 
students 
(93) 
Prisoner’s 
dilemma 
Game and 
Tullock 
Rent-
Seeking 
Game 
• Two different sequences 
(strategic vs. individual):  
First week: a Prisoner’s 
dilemma  
Second week: the two-player 
Tullock Rent-Seeking Game 
(with another subject) or a 
individual choice task (with the 
same incentives) plus a 
Prisoner’s dilemma 
Players cooperate more when they 
previously played an individual choice 
task than when the previous game is 
competitive –strategic, one (i.e. the Rent-
seeking Game) 
Cooperation and reciprocity rates decrease after 
subjects are exposed to rent-seeking competition. 
Subjects may perceive the interaction in the rent-
seeking contest as a negative one. “…an individual’s 
attitude towards others undergoes changes between 
different types of situations because they evoke 
different contextual cues”. (p. 3) “the experience of 
over-competitiveness in the contest game creates a 
disposition of rivalry in subjects that some cannot 
immediately “turn off” when the experiment ends” (p. 
26) 
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Table 4. Incentives may compromise intrinsic motives and self-determination (S) 
 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environments 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[24] Fehr, et 
al. 
(2007) 
German 
students 
(130) 
Gift-
Exchange 
Game 
• Three internal forms of enforcement: The 
principal can choose to rely on  
- a trust (pure fixed wage) contract, or a 
price deduction (i.e., fine) contract  
- a trust, a fine or an unenforceable bonus 
contract 
• Different frames: employer- employee or 
buyer-seller 
Bonus contracts yield higher joint surplus 
than the fine contract; principals converge 
towards the bonus contract. Trust contracts 
yield lower joint surplus than incentive 
contracts and bonus contracts. Agents spend 
more effort under a bonus contract than 
under a fine contract. The results are the 
same independently of the framing.  
Effectiveness of incentive contracts may 
depend on the agent's other regarding 
preferences: With fair-minded players, 
incomplete contracts that rely on fairness 
as an enforcement device (i.e., bonus) 
provide powerful incentives, superior to 
explicit incentive contracts. I 
[25] Fehr 
and 
Schmidt 
(2007) 
German 
Students 
(70) 
Gift-
Exchange 
Game 
• Two internal forms of enforcement: The 
principal can choose to rely on  
- an announced unenforceable bonus 
contract  
- A combination of the bonus contract with 
a fine. 
Most principals do not use the fine. The 
joint surplus under the pure bonus contract 
is 20 percent greater than under the 
combined contract. Wages are 54 percent 
higher in the pure bonus contract. Profits 
are not significantly different in the two 
contracts. 
“Explicit and implicit incentives are 
substitutes rather than complements” (p. 
3). Agents perceive that principals who 
are less fair are more likely to choose a 
combined contract and less likely to pay 
the announced bonus. The effect of 
effort on the bonus paid is twice as great 
in the pure bonus case. I 
[26] Falk 
and 
Kosfeld 
(2006) 
Swiss 
students 
(804) 
Gift-
Exchange 
Game 
• Different levels of suggested minimum 
level of performance (low, medium, and 
high)  
• The levels are external (medium) or 
imposed by principals  
• A gift exchange game: the principal 
decides whether to control the agent and 
also determines agent’s wage 
Most agents perform minimally as a 
response to the principals’ controlling 
decision. Majority of the principals 
anticipate this and do not control, earning 
higher profits as a result. 
Control and explicit incentives are 
signals of distrust and low expectations, 
diminish agents’ reciprocity and good 
will towards the principal. Categorical 
crowding out. I 
[27] Gneezy 
(2003)* 
U.S 
students 
(400) 
Proposer- 
Responder 
Game 
• The responder has three forms of 
enforcement (a punishment at a given cost, 
a reward at a given cost and nothing) 
• Different levels of the responder’s 
enforcement (weak, strong) 
Non-monotonic effects of explicit 
incentives (fines and rewards) on 
performance (a W -shaped function). 
Offers are highest with large incentives 
(fine and reward), and lowest with small 
incentives. The no incentive case, when 
proposers simply dictate allocation, is 
intermediate. 
Extrinsic incentives undermine intrinsic 
motivation: a small fine or reward 
changes the mode of behavior from 
“moral” to “strategic”. See Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000a, b) and Mulder, et al. 
(2006) [29] [30] [39]. Categorical 
crowding out. F 
[28] Rustrom 
(2002) 
U.S. 
students 
(110) 
Creative 
task 
('tower of 
Hanoi') 
• Two forms of external enforcement (a 
penalty or a reward) 
• Different levels of the external 
enforcement (none, weak, strong)  
Penalties degrade performance; large 
rewards induce better performance than 
small (but no better than the no-incentive 
treatment) 
Explicit incentives have a detrimental 
effect on performance, but only in the 
case of penalties, not in the case of 
rewards. Penalties 'distract' subjects.  
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 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environments 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[29] Gneezy and 
Rustichini 
(2000b) 
Israeli students 
(160 for the 
main 
experiment) 
50 IQ test 
questions 
(plus a 
Principal 
Agent 
Game) 
• Different levels of monetary 
rewards for correct IQ test 
response (very low, low, high and 
none) 
A discontinuity in the effect of incentives at 
zero. Small rewards degrade performance; 
large rewards enhance it. 
The presence of the incentive 
substitutes extrinsic for intrinsic 
motivation). Categorical crowding out. 
See Gneezy (2003) [27] F 
[30] Gneezy and 
Rustichini 
(2000b) 
Israeli students 
(180) 
Collected 
donations 
from 
households 
• Different levels of monetary 
rewards for the voluntary work 
(low, high and none) 
Discontinuity at zero. Performance with 
small rewards is lower than performance 
with high rewards and both are lower than 
performance with no rewards. 
The presence of the incentive 
substitutes extrinsic for intrinsic 
motivation). Categorical crowding out. 
See Gneezy (2003) [27] and Upton 
(1974)  
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Table 5. Incentives alter the environment in which new preferences are learned (E) 
 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environments 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[31] Burks, 
Carpenter 
and Goette 
(2009) 
Swiss and 
U.S bike 
messengers 
(139+113) 
Sequential 
Prisoners’ 
dilemma 
Game 
• Messenger exposure to performance 
based pay in their work place or not 
In a restricted sample unlikely to be affected by 
selection bias, second movers' exposure to 
performance pay is associated with between 12 
and 15 percent greater likelihood of defection on 
a cooperative first mover. 
The fact that the effects are from a 
game having no obvious connection 
with the job suggests that 
preferences learned under the 
incentive conditions of the work 
place are adopted outside the 
workplace. 
[32] Reeson and 
Tisdell 
(2008) 
Australian 
Students 
(98) 
Public Goods 
Game 
• Three external forms of enforcement:  
- moral suasion in the form of a single 
sentence to the effect that the payoff to all 
would be higher if all contributed (all 
periods);  
- a minimum contribution unexpectedly 
introduced during 4 periods and then 
removed 
- none 
While the regulation is in place (during the 
middle stage) contributions are significantly 
higher than in the initial stage in which only 
suasion occurs. After the regulation is removed, 
contributions are 20 percent lower than in the 
initial stage. The suasion treatment dramatically 
increases voluntary contributions compared to a 
no suasion control. 
Extrinsic rewards alter subjects 
preferences (crowding out other 
regarding preferences) or beliefs 
(conveying a different idea of the 
appropriate behavior in this game.) 
Categorical and marginal crowding 
out. F, C 
[33] Carpenter, 
et al. 
(2008) 
U.S 
students 
(172) 
Public Goods 
Game 
• Costly punishment: subjects can punish 
non-cooperators at a cost to themselves 
• Different team’s residual claim (marginal 
per capita return on the public good) 
• Different group size 
Shirkers are punished by peers and respond by 
contributing more, even in the last round unless 
the frequency of reciprocators is too low or the 
group is too large. High contributors who are 
punished subsequently contribute less. 
(Unpublished results not reported in paper). 
Altruistically motivated mutual 
monitoring, by enhancing shame-
induced cooperation, supports high 
levels of team performance. 
Synergistic effects of social 
preferences and peer-imposed 
incentives. I 
[34] Gaechter, 
Kessler and 
Konigstein 
(2008) * 
Swiss 
students 
(500) 
Gift-
Exchange 
Game 
• Three external forms of enforcement: a 
Trust (pure fixed wage contract), a price 
deduction (i.e., fine) contract and a bonus 
incentive contract 
• Stranger and Partner 
• Different sequences 
Under incentive contracts agents choose a self 
interested best reply (effort) and there is no 
voluntary cooperation. If the contract is not 
incentive compatible under the other contracts 
there is voluntary cooperation. Experiencing well-
designed contracts reduces voluntary cooperation 
even after incentives are withdrawn. 
Incentives may have a lasting 
negative effect on voluntary 
cooperation. F 
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 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environments 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[35] Meier (2007) Swiss students 
(11379) 
Contributions 
to two funds to 
support 
financially 
needy other 
students. 
• Matching donations: For a 
single semester subjects' 
contributions are not 
matched or matched  
• Matching donations at 
high or low rates.  
No matching in subsequent 
periods 
Matching increases contributions when 
they are in force. Those who 
experience matching are substantially 
less likely to make a contribution to 
either fund in subsequent periods; 
average contributions show a small, 
insignificant negative net effect of the 
incentive. 
The negative matching effect is probably not 
due to the information it conveys on the 
neediness of the funds (larger effect for the 
smaller matching rate) or to the subjects' 
desire to compensate for higher matching 
induced contributions in the treatment period 
(subjects whose contribution was unaffected 
by matching also exhibited a negative effect). 
F 
[36] Henrich, et al. 
(2005) 
Foragers, 
herders, others 
in 15 small-
scale 
societies 
(1128) 
Ultimatum 
Game 
• Differences between 
societies in the level of 
market integration and the 
potential payoffs to 
cooperation 
Substantial cross cultural co-variation 
between the degree of market 
integration (engagement in market 
exchange) and both average UG offers 
and the propensity to reject low offers. 
Mutually beneficial interactions in market 
interactions with strangers may support the 
evolution of cultures of fair-mindedness 
towards strangers; “doux commerce”? 
Hirschman (1977). C 
[37] Irlenbusch and 
Sliwka (2005) 
* 
German 
students 
(84) 
Gift-Exchange 
Game 
• Two internal forms of 
enforcement: The principal 
can choose to rely on  
- a trust (pure fixed wage) 
contract 
- compensation contract 
(i.e., a variable piece rate) 
• Two different sequences 
for the contracts 
Incentives reduce cooperation (i.e. 
effort level) and the effect persists after 
the incentive is removed. Where 
principals are constrained to offer fixed 
wages the effort levels of agents are 
considerably higher than when 
employers can choose an incentive 
contract.  
Incentives (price rate) alter principals’ and 
agents’ perception of the situation: "lead 
agents to adopt an individual maximization 
frame ... rather than a cooperative frame,” 
“agents have a stronger concern for the 
principal’s wellbeing in the pure fixed wage 
setting.” (p. 23) F 
[38] Bohnet, Frey 
and Huck 
(2001) 
U.S. students 
(154) 
Contract 
Enforcement 
Game (finitely 
repeated) 
• Different legal institutions 
(low, medium or high 
contract enforcement 
probability) 
• Low contract enforcement 
in the last rounds for all 
sessions. 
The probability of enforcement and/or 
the cost of breach in the early rounds 
have a non-monotonic effect on 
contract performance in the later 
rounds: intermediate levels of contract 
enforcement decrease trustworthiness, 
low levels and high levels of legal 
contract enforcement increase 
trustworthiness. 
“If there is enough time for the crowding 
dynamics to unfold, environments with low 
contract enforcement can produce outcomes 
as efficient as high levels of enforcement.” 
(p.141) “by affecting behavior, institutions 
affect preferences.” (p.142) F 
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 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environments 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[39] Gneezy and 
Rustichini 
(2000a) 
Parents 
from ten 
day care 
centers in 
Haifa, 
Israel 
 • An explicit enforcement (i.e. 
fine) is imposed for lateness in 
six of these centers. 
Tardiness doubles in the six treatment 
centers and persists even after the fine is 
removed. No change in the four control 
centers. 
The modest fine signal ‘how bad’ lateness 
is and/or is perceived as a price of a 
service and displaces an ethical frame by 
a strategic one: “A fine is a price.” I, F, S 
[40] Falkinger, et al. 
(2000) and 
personal 
communication 
from Gaechter 
18 February 
2008. 
Swiss 
students 
(196) 
Public 
Goods 
Game 
• Incentive compatible 
(Falkinger (1996)) mechanism 
and no mechanism;  
• large and small group size; 
• Interior and corner Nash 
equilibria. 
Subjects implement the self-interested level 
of contribution under the mechanism, but 
contribute substantially more than the self 
interested level in its absence (until late in the 
20 period experiments) (e.g. Figure 5). After 
experiencing the mechanism subjects 
contribute 26 percent less when it is 
withdrawn than those who have not 
experienced it. 
By rewarding contributions and 
penalizing shirkers the mechanism may 
have relieved subjects' sense of moral 
responsibility and legitimated the pursuit 
of self interest. The effects persisted after 
the withdrawal of the mechanism. F, I 
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Table 6. Incentives and social preferences as complements (C) 
 Citation Subjects 
(number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environment 
(treatments) 
Results relevant to separability Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[41] Herrmann, 
et al. 
(2008) 
16 student 
pools around 
the world  
(1120) 
 
 
 
Public 
Goods 
Game 
(Partner) 
• Monetary Costly Punishment Cooperation is higher in the punishment condition. 
However, the average payoff with the punishment 
condition is lower than the average without 
punishment in many countries. Weak norms of civic 
cooperation and the weakness of the rule of law in a 
country are significant predictors of antisocial 
punishment (punish the high contributors), which 
reduces the net benefits to the group.  
Punishment is socially beneficial only if 
complemented by strong social norms of 
cooperation with strangers so that peer 
punishment induces shame rather than 
resentment. The quality of the formal law 
enforcement institutions and informal sanctions 
are complements, “because antisocial 
punishment is lower in these societies.” (p. 
1367.) 
[42] Rodriguez
-Sickert, 
Guzmán 
and 
Cárdenas 
(2008) 
Rural 
Colombians 
from 5 
communities 
(128) 
Common 
Pool 
Resource 
Game 
• Three different forms of 
external enforcement (A fine 
regime imposed, a fine 
proposed to the players and 
rejected or accepted by them, 
none) 
• Different levels of external 
enforcement (low, and high) for 
the imposed fine 
Under all treatments other than the no fine, groups 
start at high levels of cooperation. Cooperation 
remains high only when a fine, be it high or low, is in 
force. If the players reject the fine, cooperation 
slowly unravels. Presence of low fines prevented 
unraveling of cooperation. 
When fines are rejected, the implied 
affirmation of social norms may have 
temporarily increased cooperation; reciprocal 
preferences (anger at low contributors) may 
account for the subsequent erosion of 
cooperation. Small fines enhance unconditional 
cooperation by relieving cooperators of the 
need to retaliate against defectors. I, F 
[43] Galbiati 
and 
Vertova 
(2008a) * 
Italian 
students 
(216) 
Public 
Goods 
Game – 
one shot 
(and a 
Lottery 
Game) 
• Different levels for the 
minimum level of contribution 
rule (zero, low and high) 
• A symmetric incentive 
structure (a level of contribution 
less (more) than the minimum 
contribution could be subject to 
a penalty (reward)) with low 
and medium size 
Suggested contributions alone do not induce high 
levels of cooperation. A high minimum contribution 
with the presence of an incentive raises individual 
average contributions independently of the level of 
the incentive (low or medium) and increases the 
expectation about others’ contributions. 
Incentives not only influence material payoffs 
but also frame recommended high 
contributions as obligations. Including both 
implicit and explicit incentives activate values 
and/or coordinate individuals’ beliefs, give 
salience to minimum contribution rules and 
make them act as focal points for beliefs about 
others’ contributions. Obligations directly 
affect average beliefs about others’ and 
cooperation. Categorical crowding in. F 
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 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environment 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment  
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[44] Gaechter, 
Nosenzo 
and Sefton 
(2008) * 
British 
Students 
(84) 
Gift-
Exchange 
Game with 
3-members 
firms (one 
employer 
and two 
employees)  
• Employees move sequentially 
(Employee 1 has pay comparison 
information (i.e. information about what 
coworker earns) and Employee 2 
additionally has an effort comparison 
information (information about how co-
worker performs)  
• Employers can offer high wages to 
both employees, a high wage to 
Employee 1 only, a high wage to 
Employee 2 only, and low wages to both
A homogeneous wage does not affect 
effort when an employee is matched 
with a co-worker that efforts less. 
Reciprocity is more pronounced when 
the co-worker is hard-working, as effort 
is strongly and positively related to own 
wage and when the employer pays 
unequal wages to the employees.  
Exposure to pay comparison information 
in isolation from effort comparison 
information does not appear to affect 
reciprocity toward employers 
Unequal wages conditional on worker type may 
induce high levels of reciprocity based effort; 
unconditional employer generosity fails to 
recognize the ‘deserving’ worker, and is not 
reciprocated. Incentives and social preferences as 
complements. Workers respond to employers’ 
recognition of their deservingness, not to 
employer generosity.  
[45] Lopez, et 
al. (2008a) 
* 
Colombian 
Fishermen 
(240) 
 
Public 
Goods 
Game 
• Monetary Costly Punishment. After 
making the decision individual 
contributions are publicly posted 
anonymously and subjects can sanction 
other’s contribution decisions privately. 
• plus an external enforcement 
(announcement of the socially optimal 
level of contribution) with monitoring 
• Different levels of external 
enforcement (low, and high) for the 
imposed fine 
• Two different sequences: monitoring 
and players’ sanctioning and vice versa 
Sanctions combined with external 
enforcement let to nearly perfect 
contributions and higher earnings 
Higher individual contributions with 
monetary sanctions fail to yield higher 
earnings. See Masclet, et al. (2003) 
Individuals do use the ability to sanction others in 
their group and increases cooperation.  
External regulation complements community 
enforcement efforts. 
“When community members have better 
information about the behavior of their neighbors 
than the external regulator they can fine tune 
external enforcement efforts” (p. 15) Crowding 
in. See Velez, Stranlund and Murphy (2009) 
[46] Serra 
(2008) * 
British 
students 
(180) 
Bribery 
game 
(public 
official- 
citizen) 
• Three different forms of external 
enforcement (no monitoring; top-down 
auditing, and an accountability system 
which gives citizens the opportunity to 
report corrupt officials) 
Under the combined accountability 
system, fewer officials engage in 
corruption. The presence of only top-
down auditing did not affect the amount 
of officers who demanded a bribe but 
induced corrupt officials to demand a 
higher bribe than no monitoring. 
“Non-monetary costs activated by the bottom-up 
component of the combined system had a 
significant impact on the public official’s decision 
to engage in bribery.” (p.17) 
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 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environment 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[47] Falk, 
Fehr and 
Zehnder 
(2006) 
Swiss 
Students 
(240) 
Labor 
Market 
Game (one 
employer, 
three 
workers) 
• With and without a minimum wage.  
• Two different sequences 
The introduction of a legal minimum wage 
affects workers’ fairness preferences leading 
to a rise in their reservation wages (which 
persists even after the minimum wage has 
been removed). 
“Minimum wages [may] affect [subjects'] fairness 
perceptions” (p.1376) creating moral 
“entitlements”. Obligations activate and or 
enhance social preferences. See Galbiati and 
Vertova (2008a, b) [12] [43] F, E 
[48] Masclet, 
et al. 
(2003) 
US (96) 
and French 
(44) 
students 
(140) 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
Goods 
Game 
• Two external forms of Punishment 
with different levels of disapproval 
(from 0 to 10 points received by a 
subject from any other agent): 
Monetary punishment (subjects can 
reduce the monetary payoff of others 
after observing their decisions) and non 
monetary punishment (subjects express 
disapproval of others' decisions with no 
effect on others’ earnings) 
• Stranger and Partner 
• Three stages: In the first and third 
stages without the punishment. In the 
second stage, with punishment 
Both sanctions show higher and similar 
levels of contributions. Individuals tend to 
make higher contributions relative to the 
preceding period the higher punishment they 
have received and the lower their 
contribution was relative to the group 
average. When the device is removed, having 
previous monetary sanctions show higher 
contributions than having non monetary 
sanctions but the cost of enforcing monetary 
sanctions causes overall earnings to be 
similar under both sanction treatments. 
Cooperation can be enhanced by non monetary 
sanctions for reasons that are not strategic and 
may require repeated interaction. It appears that 
non monetary punishment, while not affecting the 
best response of a pay off maximizer, nonetheless 
raised contributions by enhancing the salience of 
social motives like shame or external peer 
pressure. Guilt may lead individuals who 
contribute less than the average to increase their 
contribution levels more than others. Crowding 
in. See Lopez, et al. (2008b)  
[49] Gaechter 
and Falk 
(2002) 
Austrian 
students 
(116) 
Gift-
Exchange 
Game 
• Stranger and Partner  With repetition, effort levels are higher than 
one shot interaction and some selfish subjects 
act strategically as reciprocators and choose 
the minimal effort level in the last period 
Repeated interaction strengthens reciprocity 
norms and induces ‘imitated’ reciprocity. “The 
social norm of reciprocity and the repeated game 
incentives are complementary.” (p.18)  
[50]]Barr 
(2001) * 
Zimbabwea
n villagers 
(602) 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
Goods 
Game 
• Two external forms of non monetary 
punishment  
- Public announcement: each player 
announces her level of 
contribution to everyone present in the 
session 
- Subjects could make public verbal 
statements about each other’s 
decisions: lighthearted 
criticism or the withholding of praise 
during informal gatherings 
After the introduction of the public 
announcement and public criticism subjects 
contribute more.  
 
The fact that non-material punishment raises 
contributions suggests that it induces shame or 
other social emotions (the best response for a 
material payoff maximizer were unaffected). See 
Gaechter and Fehr (1999) and Mulder, et al. 
(2006). Subjects may contribute in accordance 
with their obligations defined with reference to 
the level of contribution that each member would 
like all community members to choose. F 
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 Citation Subjects (number) 
Games or 
activities 
Institutional environment 
(treatments) Results relevant to separability 
Comment 
(quotes are from the cited paper) 
[51] Falk, 
Gaechter 
and 
Kovacs 
(1999) 
Hungarian 
students 
(126, 38) 
Gift-
Exchange 
Game 
• Stranger and Partner  
• Two social approval treatments (face to 
face, social pressure) 
Partner treatment increased effort levels; 
social pressure has little effect. Wage 
effort relationship (based on reciprocity) 
is steeper under partner than under 
stranger. 
Repeated interactions provide powerful 
incentives while enhancing both intrinsic 
reciprocity motives and concerns for equitable 
shares (social pressure adds little).  
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